13 nov 2026

THE RULE THAT CHANGES ITS OBJECT: GRAMMAR, SYMBOLIC FORM, HISTORICAL TIME AND THE LIMITS OF SHARED KNOWLEDGE (Pāṇini, Peirce, Cassirer, Koselleck, Gruber) · LAPIEZA LAB · Anto Lloveras · Socioplastics · 2026





A rule is not merely an instruction imposed upon already intelligible materials: under particular conditions, it alters which things can be distinguished, which relationships become available and what a practice can recognise as a legitimate result. That proposition is easily exaggerated. The existence of a formal rule does not entail the discovery of something new, and a language capable of generating an enormous class of expressions need not provide a theory of the world to which those expressions refer. 

Nonetheless, the older opposition between an external reality and an internal mechanism of representation becomes unstable once attention turns to the procedures through which distinctions become available. The preliminary evidence supplied for Pāṇini offers a demanding starting point because its account of the Aṣṭādhyāyī describes grammatical organisation through technical signs, economy of formulation and shared conditions of transformation rather than a passive enumeration of completed words. The comparison must remain restricted to what the extract supports: it is not evidence that ancient Sanskrit grammarians anticipated any particular digital architecture. What survives the historical distance is the insight that a disciplined specification may organise possible transformations, not simply record their finished products. A conceptual index that merely stores the results of naming performs one kind of work; an index that specifies how distinctions may be recombined performs another. Yet rules cannot guarantee the significance of their own products. Peirce’s (1878) critique of definitional clarity exposes why. Repeated acquaintance with a word is not equivalent to a clear understanding of its implications, while precision of abstract expression may conceal the absence of a discriminable consequence. The methodological test is not whether a conceptual term can be defined without ambiguity once and for all. It is whether the term permits an investigator to anticipate, question or differentiate what would otherwise remain obscure. That does not make every concept an experimental hypothesis in a narrowly scientific sense: consequences may be practical, institutional, aesthetic or interpretative, and the procedures appropriate to each require independent justification. Peirce is valuable precisely because he creates pressure to specify those consequences. Taken together, a generative grammar and a pragmatist theory of clarity reveal two different orders of intellectual discipline: one regulates permissible formations, the other interrogates what difference their use could make. Cassirer’s analysis adds a more difficult problem. If symbolic forms contribute to establishing the objects of knowledge, it is insufficient to imagine the world as one complete stock of things waiting to be sorted by different disciplines. The selected pages of Philosophie der symbolischen Formen describe scientific concepts not as neutral copies but as intellectual symbols, and extend this problem towards language, myth and art. The distinction has particular force in spatial research. A measured temperature, an image of shade, the testimony of an inhabitant and a plan of an urban square may all concern one location, but their objects of inquiry are not automatically identical. They emerge through different practices of inscription, perception, assessment and use. An epistemic architecture would therefore make explicit not merely which terms cross-reference one another but which symbolic operations produced each description in the first place. Otherwise formal interoperability will appear to deliver agreement only because the dissimilar conditions of production have been removed. Koselleck (2004) complicates the matter further by insisting that concepts and historical circumstances are linked through changing temporal relations. A term may survive an institutional transformation, but survival of the signifier does not demonstrate continuity of its implications. Concepts preserve experiences, make some futures expectable and incorporate conflicts whose material conditions develop at different speeds. An indexed entry is thus temporally double: it has an ascertainable documentary date, while the semantic resources it mobilises may belong to other periods and its effects may unfold later. Historical interpretation must resist both the claim that meanings remain untouched by changing circumstances and the opposite assumption that each moment is wholly incomparable with the last. The problem can now be stated more sharply. Rules can produce formal stability, symbolic practices can generate different modes of objectivity, and historical experience can transform the content of concepts without altering their written names. None of these observations makes a shared knowledge system impossible. They disclose why shared knowledge must be treated as a negotiated and limited achievement rather than an automatic consequence of compatible classifications. Gruber’s (1993) design criteria clarify the technical side of that negotiation. An ontology can specify a common vocabulary for queries and assertions while leaving individual systems with different bodies of knowledge. Its value lies in consistency within stated commitments, not in an all-encompassing description of existence. Minimal ontological commitment is especially consequential: the point is to demand only those assumptions needed for communication. The apparent contradiction between formal precision and conceptual plurality is therefore partly a design problem, though never only a design problem. A system can coherently encode a contested category while remaining indifferent to the political force that category exerts. The requirement of coherence cannot decide whether a concept does justice to a person, place or historical experience. Here the five sources resist a comfortable synthesis. The more explicit the rules of admission become, the easier their exclusions are to identify; the more portable the terms become, the greater the risk of treating different practices as comparable before their conditions have been examined. The challenge is not to choose between rigour and difference, but to specify where one form of rigour ceases to be adequate to another. The consequences for Socioplastics begin at the point where documentation is mistaken for explanation. A numbered corpus can fix a statement, its provenance and its place within a continuing sequence; it cannot establish that the statement will retain the same significance whenever retrieved. The initial act of indexing gives a text an address. What follows depends upon the kinds of relation the archive allows that address to enter. If a marker names a recurring urban condition, the record must distinguish at least four things that an ordinary keyword index might blur: the words of the proposed definition; the situations from which that definition was developed; the method that allowed those situations to be recognised as relevant; and the degree to which later cases require the definition to be revised. This is not a request for exhaustive metadata. It is a request for selective accountability: the metadata should preserve those differences without which a claim cannot be interpreted or challenged. Consider an urban passage in which shelter, accessibility and permission vary according to time of day. A photograph might register an unobstructed route; a morning observation might document successful passage; an evening testimony might reveal exclusion by informal management; an administrative plan might classify the same path as publicly available. An index that assigns all four records a common label has improved retrieval but has not yet produced an explanation. To convert their conjunction into a research question, an investigator must determine what each record counts as evidence, which temporal circumstances separate their claims, and which definitions of access are being imported from different expert languages. A stable label may be necessary to compare the records, but the result of comparison may be that the label is inadequate. This possibility is not a defect of the corpus. It is the condition under which a corpus could participate in discovery rather than merely accumulating confirmations of its own vocabulary. The Paninian comparison brings one obligation: specify what an operator does, which relations it permits and what transformations follow from its use. Peirce adds another: describe what would become observable or inferable if the operator were applied, and what rival procedure would fail to produce the same distinction. Cassirer makes it necessary to preserve the symbolic medium through which the observation appears; a drawing and an interview can be related without being recoded as copies of one universal datum. Koselleck requires documentary chronology and historical semantics to remain separable, so that a concept can be revisited when a territory, institution or form of practice changes. Gruber contributes a bounded model of interoperability: define enough shared terms for another investigator to understand and test a connection, but avoid imposing more substantive agreement than the task requires. Such an arrangement would also permit a useful kind of disagreement between readers. Imagine two researchers, one trained in architectural analysis and another in the history of labour, applying an existing Socioplastics category to one set of site records. They might agree about the location and date of every document while disagreeing about what the recorded change signifies. The archive could preserve that disagreement as two traceable interpretations, each linked to its evidence and assumptions. The epistemic gain would not consist in forcing a common answer, but in making visible a difference whose significance the original classification could not register. This is why an archive’s cross-references need a grammar more discriminating than mere adjacency. A link might indicate historical derivation, methodological resemblance, contradiction, translation, shared field evidence or an intentionally speculative comparison. To distinguish those relations is to prevent the appearance of connectivity from being mistaken for a demonstration. Search and machine-readable representations intensify the problem, because an entity that is easily addressed can be recombined far beyond its initial circumstances. Reusability is valuable, but it may carry the implicit claim that the borrowed entity means the same thing in every receiving field. Stronger forms of documentation would therefore include an explicit possibility of non-transfer: a category may be appropriate to the drawing and ineffective in the interview, useful at one territorial scale and misleading at another, stable for a short observation but historically obsolete as an institutional description. None of the uploaded works establishes that Socioplastics has already operationalised such a system. They provide distinct historical and methodological arguments with which that proposition can be tested. Nor does the sheer number of authored texts establish how many new distinctions the corpus has generated. Every text can be a root insofar as it remains attributable, retrievable and available for further argument; it cannot be an unquestionable premise merely because it has been published. The more demanding inheritance from these sources is to treat the passage from one text to another as an inferential event with a recordable cost. A rule proposes a transformation, a symbolic practice determines the form in which its materials appear, a historical concept brings temporal layers into the encounter, and an ontology defines a limited common grammar for exchange. Their relation cannot be reduced to a single master language. Its productive friction becomes examinable only when the common format preserves where the materials cease to be equivalent. Within Socioplastics, this unresolved threshold between commensurability and difference is most precisely condensed by the existing marker ComparisonMould.

Anto Lloveras is an architect and transdisciplinary researcher concerned with urbanism, epistemology, documentation and the circulation of knowledge across spatial practices. Through Socioplastics and LAPIEZA-LAB, he examines how concepts and archives organise comparisons between places, institutions and forms of research.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cassirer, E. (1923) Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Erster Teil: Die Sprache. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer. Selected pages digitised by Bard Digital Commons in Hannah Arendt Personal Library—Marginalia, item 759 (2026). Available at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hapl_marginalia_all/759.

Gruber, T. R. (1993) ‘Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies Used for Knowledge Sharing’. Knowledge Systems Laboratory Technical Report KSL 93-04. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Later journal publication: International Journal of Human–Computer Studies, 43 (1995), pp. 907–928. https://doi.org/10.1006/ijhc.1995.1081.

Koselleck, R. (2004) ‘Historia de los conceptos y conceptos de historia’. Translated by J. Fernández Sebastián and G. Capellán de Miguel. Ayer, 53(1), pp. 27–45.

Pāṇini (1891–1898) The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, interpreted according to the Kāśikāvṛtti of Jayāditya and Vāmana. Translated by Śrīśa Chandra Vasu. Allahabad and Benares: various publishers. Consulted through preliminary extracts in the edited digital compilation of J. R. Black (2011–2012).

Peirce, C. S. (1878) ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. Popular Science Monthly, 12, pp. 286–302.