Rheinberger’s “On Science and Philosophy” advances a historical epistemology in which philosophy of science can no longer claim to organise knowledge from above, but must instead follow the concrete, changing and experimental practices through which scientific objects come into being. Beginning with Cassirer and Bachelard, the essay argues that the age of grand philosophical systems has passed, since the sciences themselves have diversified so radically that only historically situated reflection can grasp their development. Cassirer’s importance lies in replacing metaphysical system-building with an account of knowledge as a problem-oriented process, where objects are not simply given but mediated through specific instruments, practices and conceptual forms. Bachelard radicalises this position by insisting that every hypothesis, problem, experiment and equation demands its own philosophy, because scientific reason is not fixed in advance but transformed by the very activity of research. Rheinberger’s own contribution emerges from this lineage: modern science must be understood through experimentation, not as a subordinate test of theory, but as the generative space where epistemic things take shape within experimental systems. These systems stabilise objects enough to make them researchable while preserving the ambiguity that drives inquiry beyond its existing limits. The specific case of experimental molecular biology underpins this view, demonstrating that scientific knowledge advances through apparatuses, procedures, materials and uncertainties rather than through speculation alone. Ultimately, Rheinberger concludes that philosophy remains vital only when it accepts its entanglement with scientific practice and becomes a historical reflection on how research risks, reorganises and renews reason itself.
