Adichie turns narrative asymmetry into a theory of identity and power. The “single story” does not operate simply by disseminating false information; it reduces complex persons and places to one repeatedly available account until that account becomes the dominant condition of recognition. Her autobiographical examples show that representation works through repetition, unequal access to narration and the authority to decide which stories become general knowledge. Methodologically, the talk uses situated narrative rather than abstract typology, allowing the argument to demonstrate its own claim: multiplicity is restored by adding standpoints, histories and contradictions that a dominant account has excluded. The bridge to social psychology is direct because categorisation and stereotype are shown as narrative processes, while the bridge to postcolonial theory lies in the unequal distribution of representational power. Identity emerges as vulnerable to narrative compression but not reducible to it. Counter-storytelling becomes an epistemic and political practice through which categories can be reopened rather than merely replaced by new fixed images.
Vázquez and Muñoz displace memory from the model of individual storage toward an account of remembering as social action. Their key proposition is that the past is not simply retained and retrieved; it is reconstructed through language, interaction, artefacts, institutions and present concerns. The distinction between “social” and “collective” memory becomes analytically productive because it forces the question of how a collectivity can remember without being reduced to an aggregate of individual brains. Methodologically, the chapter moves from conventional psychological treatments of memory toward constructionist and discursive approaches, emphasising shared meanings and the practical consequences of versions of the past. Remembering and forgetting are therefore not neutral cognitive operations but ways of organising responsibility, continuity and possible action. The chapter bridges social psychology with historiography, memory studies and public culture. Its strongest implication is that identity depends on temporal infrastructures: groups and persons become intelligible by sustaining narratives of continuity whose form is negotiated in the present.
Gómez Mendoza defines the geographical gaze as a disciplined capacity to move between observation, synthesis, scale and historical transformation. Landscape is not reduced to image or aesthetic object: it is a quality of territory whose intelligibility depends on knowing how natural and cultural relations have been assembled through time. The essay gives particular force to fieldwork and direct observation, recovering Manuel de Terán’s maxim of a geography of ‘andar y ver’ while linking it to Humboldtian visual thinking and narrative ordering. Its most consequential claim concerns scale: changing scale is not equivalent to enlarging or reducing the same object, because different phenomena become visible, significant or unintelligible at different spatial levels. Medium scales acquire special importance as territorial and landscape observatories. The wider bridge is to epistemology: geographical knowledge is produced through calibrated acts of seeing, moving, narrating and rescaling, each of which transforms what can legitimately count as the object under study.
Brandtner and Wegmann situate FoMO within the cognitive-affective dynamics of desire rather than treating it as inherently pathological. Drawing on the Elaborated Intrusion Theory of Desire, they test how desire thinking, FoMO and craving interact in problematic social networking-site use among 193 participants. Their most important conceptual result is negative in a productive sense: neither desire thinking nor FoMO becomes dysfunctional by definition; problematicity emerges through their interaction with craving and patterns of use. This reframes FoMO as a contingent process rather than a fixed deficit. Methodologically, the study uses serial mediation to specify the sequence through which verbally elaborated desire can contribute to FoMO and, under certain conditions, problematic use. The work bridges cognitive psychology, behavioural addiction research and media studies by locating platform use within loops of anticipation, imagined participation and recurrent checking. It thereby complicates moralising accounts of digital behaviour and provides a mechanism-sensitive model of how affective anticipation becomes technologically organised.
Mesquita, De Leersnyder and Boiger replace the image of culture as an external modifier of universal emotions with a processual account in which emotions are made through recurrent social relations and culturally patterned situations. Their central contribution is the concept of emotional fit: affective experience can align more or less closely with culturally prevalent patterns, and that alignment changes through participation, migration and social contact. The chapter draws on cross-cultural comparisons, diary studies, survey data and acculturation research, but its methodological argument is more radical than simple comparison. Context should not be controlled away as noise because context partly constitutes the phenomenon. Emotional episodes are therefore relational accomplishments embedded in moral orders, interactional expectations and culturally valued forms of action. This position bridges cultural psychology with ecological and situated approaches to cognition. It also challenges decontextualised experimental designs by proposing that emotional processes should be studied where they are socially produced: in practices, relationships and environments rather than as isolated responses.